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ARTICLE
(Con)trolling the Web: Social Media User Arrests,
State-Supported Vigilantism and Citizen Counter-Forces in
Russia
Rashid Gabdulhakov
Department of Media and Communication, Erasmus University Rotterdam, the Netherlands
ABSTRACT
This article applies Haggerty and Ericson’s surveillant assemblage
concept to to the recent wave of social media user arrests in Russia.
In doing so, it addresses the legislative frameworks applied to
online self-expression, depicts the nuances of legal charges pressed
against select social media users, assesses the role of formal law
enforcement and vigilant citizens recruited to extend the state’s
watchful gaze, and elaborates on citizen counter-forces resisting
the tightening state control over the digital domain. The article
argues that Russia’s internet users appear to be trolled by the ruling
elite through the use of obscure legal frameworks and the stam-
pede of actors and practices where select individuals face legal
charges for their activities on social media, while other users face
no consequences for the same engagements. Such unpredictability
stimulates self-censorship, making the system eﬀective by virtue of
its dysfunctionality. Methodologically, the study relies on desk
research and ﬁeld interviews.
KEYWORDS
Internet governance; Russia;
social media; surveillant
assemblage; vigilantism
For my friends, everything; for my enemies, the law.1
1. Introduction
In November 2016, a regional coordinator of Open Russia Foundation2 in Chuvashia,
Dmitry Semenov faced administrative charges for posts on his VKontakte page (Russia’s
analogue of Facebook). The posts exposed Russia’s parliament member wearing a shirt
with a sign ‘Orthodoxy or death’, and were qualiﬁed by law enforcement as an oﬀence for
‘production and distribution of extremist materials’.3 While the police did not go after the
politician being the source of such ‘materials’, Semenov faced charges and was ﬁned.4
This is one out of hundreds of similarly preposterous cases that rambled across Russia
following waves of amendments to the criminal code. The 2014 amendments incorpo-
rated online speech into oﬀences governed by anti-extremism laws; the 2016 Yarovaya
law package intensiﬁed punishment for such oﬀences5; and 2019 ‘anti-fake news’ legisla-
tion made it illegal for citizens to express disrespect at those with political power. As the
deﬁnitions of ‘extremism’6 and ‘disrespect’ remain open to interpretation, a mere ‘like’ on
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social media can lead to criminal charges, sentences and ﬁnes, making all internet users in
Russia potentially vulnerable to legal repercussions. Indeed, over several years there has
been a steady increase in extremism charges in Russia, with most of the cases concerning
online speech.7
The study identiﬁes legal frameworks and investigates formal and informal forces
serving the state in web control; while also elaborating on citizen counter-forces opposing
these control measures. Among state actors are ‘Centre E’ – Russia’s extremism-
countering police8 – involved in heavy monitoring of the digital domain.9 In 2011, the
state has established the Safe Internet League10 and recruited citizen Cyber Guards11 to
monitor, identify and report on dangerous online content. Other pro-state vigilante
formations include Je Suis Maidan [I am Maidan]12 and SILOVIKI [Security oﬃcers]13 who
engage in what Lovelock classiﬁes as ‘hounding’14 by exposing protestors, opposition
leaders and activists and calling on the followers to retaliate on these targets.
Counter-forces to the state include the civil analytics project Database, which specialises
in exposing the snitches15 and ‘those responsible for human rights violations and corrup-
tion in Russia’16; the Internet Protection Society, opposing censorship, excessive regulation,
and administrative arbitrariness in internet governance17; and Roskomsvoboda, a public
organisation ‘countering Internet censorship and promoting the ideas of freedom of
information and self-regulation of the Internet industry’.18 While the analysis of select
user arrests seeks to identify themes in ‘oﬀences’ that cost users their freedom, mapping
the actors and forces allows for an informed analysis of their capacities, inter-relations, and
the clashing interests in regulation of online self-expression.
The article relies on Haggerty and Ericson’s concept of the ‘surveillant assemblage’ –
a compendium of surveillance practices where extra state institutions, machines, ﬂows,
and other components come together in rhizomatic practices that level surveillance
hierarchies.19 The concept is applied to the case of Russia, where the ruling elite’s quest
for securing control over online self-expression has led to the adaptation of strategic
regulatory and punitive practices targeting users. A variety of methods and actors are
instrumentalized by the state in this endeavour.
While current literature on surveillance addresses an array of issues related to Internet
governance,20 platforms,21 authoritarian states,22 and surveillance in post-communist
societies,23 the case of Russia requires further scholarly attention as the country repre-
sents a peculiar case of selectivity in the application of restrictive legislation. Strategic
legislation adapted by the Kremlin faces challenges in implementation when actors
struggle to serve-up to the state amid the vagueness of legal deﬁnitions. As a result,
Russia’s digital domain and social media users appear to be trolled24 by the ruling elite
through the use of obscure legal frameworks and the stampede of actors and practices
where select individuals face legal charges for their activities on social media, while other
users face no consequences for the same engagements.
The article ﬁrst elaborates on the methods and proceeds to introduce theoretical
frameworks operationalised to address the Kremlin’s attempts to discipline social media
users. After unpacking Russia’s surveillant assemblage and discussing its past-oriented
governance measures, the article proposes and addresses three pillars for understanding
current practices of online self-expression control in the country – (1) legal frameworks; (2)
targeted individuals/online speech; and (3) state-loyal vigilantes/citizen counter-forces.
The discussion of key ﬁndings is followed by a conclusion.
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2. Methods
This article utilises several methodological approaches, including desk research and ﬁeld
interviews. Desk research focused on strategic legislation and criminal cases instigated
against social media users. Semi-structured in-depth interviews were conducted with
a diverse set of informants, including lawyers working on internet-related cases, rights
defenders, academics working on issues of internet freedom and online activism in Russia,
representatives of NGOs, and law enforcement authorities. Interviewees were selected
based on their expertise in the domain of Russia’s internet governance and were recruited
with the aim of representation of various clusters of actors. The informants were asked
questions concerning online activism, vigilantism, and internet governance in the coun-
try. Interviews were conducted in 2018 and 2019 in-person and via online messengers.
The author transcribed and translated content from Russian into English.
To protect the privacy and safety of the informants, their names will not be disclosed in
this article. Instead, a reference to the general position of informants will be made, i.e.
‘academic’, ‘lawyer’, ‘rights defender’, ‘police oﬃcer’, etc. Such anonymisation has no
impact on the data and its quality. Legal cases addressed in the scope of this work are
public, thus will not be anonymised. Annexe 1 provides a list of interviewees along with
information on the location, date and type of interview. Interview materials are used
throughout the text of the paper in the form of short and extended quotations, providing
expert and insider views and knowledge on given cases, notions, or practices.
3. Theoretical background
Surveillance studies gained momentum in the second half of the twentieth century due to
an increase in the ‘number and type of surveillance technologies’.25 Building on Jeremy
Bentham’s panoptic architectural design, Michel Foucault proposed the idea of
a ‘discipline society’ in which an individual is not only watched but is ‘carefully
fabricated’.26 Taking the analogy of prisoners and the all-seeing yet discrete guard,
Foucault applies power structures and hierarchies to society beyond the prison cell in
‘the relations of discipline’.27 For several decades, Foucault’s panopticism dominated
scholarship as the primary and canonical foundation in the conceptualisation of surveil-
lance practices.28 Yet, with technological advances, surveillance capacities and
approaches have transformed vastly since the 1970s, leading to the search for new
theories and analogies.
Having proposed not to stretch panopticism too far in trying to apply it to contempor-
ary post-disciplinary-conﬁnement surveillance practices, Haggerty and Ericson build upon
Deleuze and Guattari’s ideas of ‘a convergence of what were once discrete surveillance
systems’ in the societal shift from discipline to control29 and propose the concept of the
surveillant assemblage.30 The authors describe the assemblage as a sphere where there is
a ‘desire to bring systems together’,31 meaning that all separate clusters, institutions,
mechanisms, machines, and so on are coming together in an all-seeing and all-tracing
entity. Thus, being comprised of various mechanisms, modus operandi of the assemblage
is no longer solely state-centric as it tends to incorporate ‘extra-state institutions’.32 As
such, Haggerty and Ericson argue that surveillance is no longer carried out in a purely top-
down approach of Orwellian ‘Big-Brother’, but rhizomatic practices allow for bottom-up
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scrutiny of the powerful by the wider masses and by institutions through levelling of
surveillance hierarchies, thus bringing new groups which were ‘previously exempt from
surveillance’ under the watchful gaze.33 Escaping the gaze of the assemblage is a nearly
impossible task, because the conglomerate of mechanisms, measures, and practices of
control breeds the phenomenon of ‘disappearance of disappearance’,34 as social institu-
tions are increasingly armed with far-reaching surveillance apparatuses.
In ‘Postscript on the Societies of Control’ Deleuze proposes to replace an ‘individual’
that was relevant to the Foucauldian ‘discipline society’ with the concept of ‘dividual’35 as
surveillance is no longer body-centric. Haggerty and Ericson further develop the idea that
not only has surveillance moved beyond state institutions and towards a multi-actor
assemblage, but it has also moved beyond the physical body and towards ‘a decorpor-
ealized body, a ‘data double’ of pure virtuality’.36 (In)dividuals, leave a constant digital
trace by virtue of continuous scanning and storing of interactions, purchases, movements,
expressions, habits, searches etc., etc.
While such turns in surveillance aﬀordances certainly aﬀect all social strata, online
vulnerabilities37 can be directly linked to oﬄine fragile statuses of persons in question. For
instance, building his arguments on the example of intensiﬁed welfare monitoring in
Canada, Sean Hier demonstrates how by means of the surveillant assemblage social
institutions intrude into the lives of already disadvantaged people with prejudicial eva-
luations and populist underpinnings.38 In this regard, in the words of Virginia Eubanks,
inequality is ‘automated’ in the system that puts ‘the poor’ and disadvantaged people into
further conditions of fragility.39
Over the years, the scholarly thought surrounding surveillance has moved beyond the
Foucauldian panopticism and proposes the idea of an assemblage where amid the near-
impossibility to avoid the gaze due to the rhizomatic nature of its [the assemblage’s]
components, anyone can watch anyone. Here, of course, it is important to consider
various capacities and power asymmetries40 of actors involved. Beyond the departure
from institutions and top-down surveillance, there is a departure from viewing the
physical body as a sole subject amid digital traces that make up the digital twins of (in)
dividuals. ‘Sub-assemblages’ are comprised of groups, systems, and counter-forces. Per
Haggarty and Ericson, these assemblages are ‘themselves multiple’, consisting of ‘diﬀer-
ent discrete assemblages’41 each having own agenda, ambitions, and approaches.
4. Unpacking Russia’s surveillant assemblage: towards the ‘digital iron
curtain’?
Having secured control over traditional media,42 Russia’s ruling regime entered a battle
with content shared on social media ‘to consolidate an information dominance over
citizens’.43 The online sphere imposes several perceived threats on regime stability in
Moscow, including counter-narratives to oﬃcial propaganda,44 dissent, activist resistance
practices,45 and coordination of potential revolutionary forces.46 At the same time, digital
media is not solely a challenge but is also an opportunity for the ruling elite; as is argued
by Oates, it provides a set of ‘particular advantages to a repressive regime that can pro-
actively shape the media narrative’.47 Beyond the direct control over broadcasters
through ownership, and indirect control over domestic social media secured through
the loyalty of platform owners, Russia’s political elite does not tolerate competition when
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it comes to strategic discourse. As Oates puts it, ‘it is not so much about who owns or
controls the media, it is more about who is constructing and disseminating the most
compelling national narrative . . . ’48 While traditional media adapts its pitching tactics,
amid new challenges imposed by the online sphere the regime ﬁnds itself in need of
taking further actions to protect its monopoly on the digitally-dispersed information.
Current actions and practices of control applied to the digital domain resemble an
echo from Russia’s Soviet past. The concept of ‘post-communism’ implies the state of ‘in-
betweenness', where past legacies and ‘poor institutional performance and leadership’
are preventing positive transformation in certain pollical contexts.49 During the period of
transition, which in itself does not bond to any speciﬁc time frame, the regime, while
certainly adapting to new realities with new strategies, may, nevertheless, turn to familiar
past practices such as censorship, showcase arrests, adaptation of punitive legislation, and
recruitment of vigilant citizens.
Selective social media user arrests are a by-product of Russia’s surveillant assem-
blage which is programmed to secure state-approved narratives at any cost and is
aided by strategic legislation. While appearing to be inspired by China’s ﬁrewall,
Russia’s approaches and capacities are diﬀerent. As a Moscow-based rights defender
explained:
Russia does not have the required resources to build a ﬁrewall, nor does it put such a task for
itself. Russia’s regulatory framework grounds itself on the idea of a broad deﬁnition of
restrictions with their selective consequent application . . . It is quite obvious, as a thousand
people can make the same post, and only one will suﬀer the consequences.50
Therefore, Russia’s throwback to authoritarianism is accompanied by opaque conditions
for understanding what is allowed and what is not in online self-expression. This lack of
clarity inﬂuences the assemblage by making its function subjective and ﬂexible in the
hands of multiple sub-assemblages.
The term ‘Digital Iron Curtain’ that appears in the title of this subsection is intended to
illustrate this past-oriented motion in the Kremlin’s attempt to control the internet,
referring to the Soviet Iron Curtain which worked towards isolation of the Soviet people
from contact with the ‘evil West’. In Russia, the internet is framed by the regime as a ‘CIA
tool’51 – something that threatens national security and endangers users. Furthermore,
the Kremlin is taking steps towards potential isolation of Russia’s internet users from the
world wide web by making the country’s internet ‘sovereign’.52 The state justiﬁes these
measures as an intent to make the internet more stable and immune to external attacks.
Yet, rights defenders and activists are concerned that ‘sovereign internet’ law would give
the state more opportunities for control and would jeopardise internet freedom even
further.53
5. Legal frameworks applied to social media
The web of forces comprising Russia’s surveillant assemblage certainly includes legislative
frameworks targeting social media users. In the majority of cases, criminal code articles
dealing with terrorism, extremism and xenophobia are applied to social media activity.
‘Nearly every day in 2017 and ﬁrst half of 2018ʹ criminal charges were being pressed
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against users over ‘likes’, posts, and other social media engagements.54 As such, in 2017,
460 social media users were charged under Article 282 Part 155:
Actions aimed at the incitement of hatred or enmity, as well as abasement of dignity of
a person or a group of persons on the basis of sex, race, nationality, language, origin, attitude
to religion, as well as aﬃliation to any social group, if these acts have been committed in
public or with the use of mass media . . . 56
Other users faced charges under Article 280 ‘public appeals for the performance of
extremist activity’ and Article 205 ‘act of terrorism’.57
User arrests based on Article 148 of the Criminal Code ‘incitement of hatred and insult
to the religious feelings of believers’ take root in the “oﬀence” committed by a protest
punk rock band Pussy Riot. In 2012, three band members performed a ‘punk prayer’ in
which they ‘danced around and shouted their song, “Virgin Mary, Get Putin Out”’.58 In
their act, Pussy Riot simultaneously encroached on two untouchables in Russia – the
Russian Orthodox Church and the president. Criminal code Article 213 – hooliganism was
applied and all three members were sentenced to two years in the penal colony.59 This
incident was followed by amendments to Article 148 of the criminal code of the Russian
Federation in 2013 ‘in the aim of protecting religious convictions and feelings’.60
In addition to Article 148, amendments were introduced to other criminal code articles,
including the above-mentioned Article 282, and Article 20561 that concerns terrorism and
public security, deﬁning the former as:
. . . the perpetration of an explosion, arson, or any other action endangering the lives of
people, causing sizable property damage, or entailing other socially dangerous conse-
quences, if these actions have been committed for the purpose of violating public security,
frightening the population, or exerting inﬂuence on decision-making by governmental
bodies, and also the threat of committing said actions for the same ends . . .
When applied to the social media sphere, charges under Article 205 can be pressed
for ‘reposting of blogs or other online messages’,62 creating uncertainty and confu-
sion as ‘likes’ and ‘shares’ on social media can be interpreted as an endorsement of
terrorism.
A Moscow-based lawyer working on social media-related cases described these
amendments as ‘reactionary’; ‘any new event leads to the development of new articles
and amendments to the criminal code’.63 The lawyer further explained that after the
amendments that expanded its scope andmade it applicable to online activity, Article 205
is increasingly applied to social media cases. ‘First, 282, and now a trendy one is Article
205 – terrorism. Terrorism implies long sentences. Terrorism is a trendy article’.64 While the
scope of Criminal Code articles widens, and punishment for oﬀences gets harsher, the
‘oﬃcials’ can ‘interpret a wide range of government opposition as “extreme”’.65 Even civil
servants are interpreted to be a ‘separate social group’,66 and criticisms of this group on
social media can cost users their freedom.
In March 2019, President Vladimir Putin signed the law on ‘fake news’ and ‘disrespect’
of the government, making it a crime to ‘insult’ the authorities.67 A month later, the law
was used against an internet user68 over a social media post referring to Russia’s president
in an obscene manner. Focus on the nature of oﬀences in social media user arrests will
further illuminate the themes that get users into trouble in Russia.
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6. Targeted individuals and online speech
There is an intricate approach to reporting on litigation against social media users. On the
one hand, media reports are an important tool in showcasing the type of activities that are
not welcomed by the regime, thus disciplining others by letting them know about the
consequences. On the other hand, an abundance of reports may portray the regime as
overly repressive. Not all cases of social media user arrests are reported on in the media or
otherwise made public. Internet Protection Society (IPS) NGO maintains a database of
cases concerning online speech across the country. IPS compiled a map of criminal and
administrative charges, staring with 2015.69 As of 21 October 2019, the database con-
tained 990 cases coming predominantly from the archives of a Moscow-based NGO SOVA.
While IPS’ map desegregates cases by regions of the Russian Federation, by dates, and by
platforms,70 it does not provide a thematic categorisation. The author seeks to expand the
understanding of the types of targeted speech and individuals through own analysis of
the categories of charges. This classiﬁcation should be regarded as a ﬂexible structure,
subject to expansion upon newly emerging cases.
Among the recurring themes in online speech that cost users their freedom, this study
identiﬁes xenophobia (including Nazism and anti-Semitism); calls for unsanctioned pro-
tests; faith and lack thereof; challenging state authority (ruling elite, police, judges); and
Russia-Ukraine conﬂict. This section of the article will provide several snapshots from the
pool of cases, to illustrate the abovementioned classiﬁcation.
6.1. Xenophobia
Most cases of litigation against social media users concern xenophobia. The details of
posts and activities that lead to charges, arrests and ﬁnes are not always provided by the
police or mass media. As per pressed charges, this category of oﬀences includes anti-
Semitism, fascism, nationalism, Nazism, racism, ultra-right views, etc. Some cases con-
cerned xenophobia targeting people from Central Asia and the Caucasus; other cases, on
the contrary, implied targeting ethnic Russians.
Following a period of tolerance towards neo-Nazi and far-right formations, Russia’s
domestic security apparatus cracked down on both in the last few years.71 Amid the
cultural and political signiﬁcance of Soviet victory in WWII, display of any Nazi attributes is
considered to be an extremist act. As such, the situation with social media posts of Nazi
symbols at times reaches absurd levels as users have faced the law over posts in which
they condemn fascism.72 Moreover, posts about Soviet victory in WWII, displaying the
surrender of Nazi soldiers in 1945 have also attracted the attention of the state.73 Due to
the vague deﬁnition of extreme speech, practically anyone can be arrested for virtually
anything in Russia. A photo from a museum, or historical textbook, a research-related
survey,74 or a screenshot from a movie or TV programme can get a person arrested or
ﬁned, while the source of the content would suﬀer no consequences.75
6.2. Calls for unsanctioned protests
Several cases of litigation over online activity involved ‘calls for unsanctioned protests’.
Here, the assemblage reacts to the expected targets such as the opposition leaders and
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activists,76 as well as random internet users. One of such examples concerns a student in
Saint Petersburg, Oksana Borisova, who shared a post about an unsanctioned protest to
be taking place in another city – Mineralnye Vody – on her VKontakte page. The next
morning police came after her to the university. Up to six oﬃcers were ﬂown in from
another region to capture Borisova, who was found guilty and served one day of admin-
istrative arrest.77
6.3. Faith and lack thereof
Another recurring theme for charges pressed against social media users is centred around
faith and atheism. Convicts are usually charged on the basis of a conjunction of several
criminal code articles. Article 148 ‘incitement of hatred and insult to the religious feelings
of believers’ along with Article 282 ‘Incitement of hatred or enmity, as well as abasement
of human dignity’ and later Article 138 ‘violation of the secrecy of correspondence,
telephone conversations, postal, telegraphic and other messages’ were used to press
criminal charges and convict a 22-year old blogger Ruslan Sokolovsky to 3.5 years of
suspended sentence (reduced to 2.3 years of a suspended sentence upon appeal)78 for
playing Pokémon Go inside of a church.79 Evidence was produced by Sokolovsky himself
as he posted his prank video on YouTube, catching Pokémon inside of the Russian
Orthodox Church of All Saints in Yekaterinburg.80 Commenting on the case,
Sokolovsky’s lawyer stated that such a harsh response is intended to ‘“frighten and
intimidate” bloggers and other internet users in Russia and to prevent them from speak-
ing freely online’.81 Sokolovsky’s name currently appears among extremists and terrorists
listed on the website of the Federal Financial Monitoring Service of the Russian
Federation.82
In another case of incitement of hatred and insult to the religious feelings of
believers, atheist Viktor Krasnov faced charges for denying God’s existence on
VKontakte social network.83 Charges against Krasnov were eventually dropped, but his
lawyer believes that those who initiated the case ‘were used by law enforcement to
“complete a plan” to produce a certain number of convictions’.84 This practice of ‘plan
fulﬁlment’ implies that law enforcement authorities are assigned a quota for a certain
number of cases on diﬀerent oﬀences, and ‘they have to ﬁnd lawbreakers, even if the
latter do not exist’.85
In the Siberian city of Barnaul, 23-year-old Maria Motuznaya faced charges on extremism
and incitement of hatred and insult to the religious feelings of believers under Articles 282
and 148 of the criminal code of the Russian Federation.86 Combined charges could have
costedMotuznaya up to 6 years of freedom for thememes she posted in a private album on
her page on VKontakte social network.87 Motuznaya appeared among extremists and
terrorists listed on the website of the Federal Financial Monitoring Service,88 and decided
to leave Russia in 2018. The case against her was discontinued in 2019.
Other cases varied thematically and included posts allegedly targeting Christians,
Muslims, non-Christians, non-Muslims, etc. Given that Jehovah’s Witnesses are deemed
extremist in Russia since 2017,89 several charges targeted related content.
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6.4. Challenging state authority
Even before the law on ‘fake news’ and ‘disrespect of authority’, posts about civil servants,
including the president, could lead to arrests. In 2018, Vladimir Egorov of Tver was
convicted to ‘a two-year suspended sentence and three years of probation’90 for his
post on VKontakte social network where he referred to President Putin as ‘the main rat
in the Kremlin’.91 Egorov currently appears among extremists and terrorists listed on the
website of the Federal Financial Monitoring Service.92
In March 2018, 10 people faced charges on extremism under Article 282 for establish-
ing an ‘extremist’ organisation called Novoe Velichie [The New Greatness],93 through the
use of social media. Two of the arrested are teenagers.94 The case received wide media
coverage and resulted in numerous protests known as Mothers’ March.95 The case of
Novoe Velichie is surrounded with controversies and is believed to be an entrapment
organised by law enforcement – ‘ . . . they developed all oﬃcial documentation them-
selves and they rented an oﬃce for this organisation and they themselves turned this
organisation in!’96
6.5. Russia-Ukraine conﬂict
Russia-Ukraine conﬂict and annexation of Crimea were recurring themes in internet-
related charges and arrests. In 2015, VKontakte user Andrey Bubeyev faced charges
under Article 282 for sharing a video, which referred to Russia as a ‘fascist aggressor’97 in
the context of the conﬂict in Ukraine. Convicted to 10 months and while in custody,
Bubeyev faced new charges under Article 280 part 1 for a diﬀerent post on VKontakte,
stating that ‘Crimea is Ukraine’,98 which was interpreted as a threat to Russia’s territorial
integrity.99 Bubeyev currently appears among extremists and terrorists listed on the
website of the Federal Financial Monitoring Service of the Russian Federation.100 Among
several internet users who faced litigation over shared music is Roman Grishin of Kaluga,
charged under Article 282 part 1. On his VKontakte page,101 Grishin shared a video clip
to a song by Boris Sevastyanov ‘New hit from Kharkiv: This, baby, is Rushism,’ which
questions and criticises Russia’s presence in Ukraine.102
What can be concluded about targeted individuals and online speech is the fact that
cases include both people who are already under the radar as well as random social media
users. There is a certain geographical context in the nature of police reactions to online
activity. As an academic in St. Petersburg explained:
The application of anti-terrorism legislation is geographically subjective. What is possible in
Moscow and St. Petersburg can cost users their freedom in, say, Tumen. It is not just about the
laws, it is about the implementation practices.103
A representative of a public opinion NGO in Moscow conﬁrms this idea of diﬀerentiation
between Russia’s two major cities and the rest of the country, and emphasises the lack of
clarity in the interpretation and implementation of legislation:
People who get in trouble for their posts are selected based on their activism. Sometimes
there are random arrests, of course. Many cases come from Russia’s regions and not from
Moscow. Perhaps, people in Moscow are more cautious or more informed. In general, what is
allowed and what is not allowed is not clear. It really is a gamble.104
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In general, litigation concerned thematically polar topics and could target users for
homophobia105 and gay propaganda;106 hate towards women107 and radical feminism-
108 at the same time. Although partial decriminalisation of Article 282109 at the dawn of
2018 lead to suspension of several cases, the system is functioning in such a way that
potentially any social media activity can lead to charges and sentences, if necessary.
7. Sub-assemblages: authorised law enforcement and pro-state vigilantes
To proceed further in the pursuit of unpacking approaches to social media control, we
must address forces and sub-groups in the assemblage. One of such sub-assemblages is
the Chief Directorate of the Ministry of Internal Aﬀairs of the Russian Federation for
Combating Extremism, also known as ‘Centre E’. Established in 2008, the Centre consti-
tutes an independent unit within police forces and its mandate includes ‘development
and implementation of state policy and legal regulation, as well as enforcement powers in
the ﬁeld of countering extremist activities and terrorism’.110 ‘Centre E’ is the main law
enforcement body responsible for monitoring and reacting to extremism expressed
online. In an interview to Meduza – a Latvia based online newspaper and aggregator of
manually selected news, texts and podcasts in Russian and English languages – the
Centre’s former agent explained that while some of the units ‘ﬁght the true evil of our
time’; in principle, people are charged with extremism through two approaches; the ﬁrst
one involves high proﬁle ‘public ﬁgures who get charged after the government machine
decides to “take them out”’; while the second category is a product of the so-called ‘stick
system’ – police quotas for the number of crimes reported in a given area.111 These
revelations are illustrative of both the power in the hands of the ruling elite and its sub-
assemblages, and the danger of the system where police are assigned a quota.
In terms of collaboration between vigilant citizens and police, there is an intriguing
link. As Daucé, Loveluck, Ostromooukhova, and Zaytseva explain it, in ‘the coexistence of
several online citizen surveillance models’, including ‘expert investigators’ (internet com-
panies and security specialists) and ‘political cyber patrols’ (state-loyal vigilantes) there is
a competition-driven tension.112 At the same time, the evolving legislation is establishing
a stage for ‘mutual vigilance between law-enforcement agencies and online surveillance
volunteers’.113
Areas of the intersection of sub-assemblages are not necessarily perceived as highly
productive by either party. As one law enforcement oﬃcer put it, ‘at the end of the day,
they [vigilantes] still turn to the state, but instead of helping the state they just get in the
way’.114 When asked about potential ties and resemblances between Soviet-era citizen
involvement in matters of justice and contemporary vigilantes, the police oﬃcer
expressed nostalgia for the Soviet times, when police had greater control over citizen
volunteer groups.115 These insights led to questions concerning unity in the vision of
diﬀerent sub-assemblages. Is there a unifying vector or is the system a compendium of
broad visions, interests and motivations that are handy for the regime as long as the
regime itself is not targeted? As an academic in Saint Petersburg put it:
You see, in order for the institutions to function, people who are part of these institutions
should possess a respective motivation. This is related to the size of salary, discipline,
organizational issues. When people are involved in crackdowns on demonstrations, they do
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not understand themselves what they are cracking down on, or why they capture these
people.116
Thus, the assemblage appears to be functional within its dysfunctionality. Weak institu-
tions, lack of professionalism, and absence of the rule of law lead to a scenario where no
one is immune to retaliation, and this uncertainty is a signiﬁcant motivator for self-
censorship. At the same time, vagueness allowed for control over each sub assemblage,
as the diversity of motives for participation leads to diversity among actors willing or
forced to join the assemblage, without necessarily understanding its overarching
objectives.
Sub-assemblage participants can be categorised into those generating counter-dissent
content (pro-Kremlin bloggers, trolls) and those engaged in tracking and reporting on
dissent content (kiberdruzhinas, anti-maidaners).117 This active citizenry can conveniently
assist the ruling elite in muting repellent voices. Contrary to the traditional understanding
of vigilantism, which implies autonomy of citizen actors,118 in Russia, vigilant citizens can
be recruited by the state,119 sometimes representing a quasi-citizen-led force with
a façade agenda.
In addition to the amended legal framework, new initiatives were passed to encourage
reporting on crime. The previously ‘rare and unregulated’120 practice of ﬁnancially
rewarding citizens for their contribution to crime-solving was turned into an oﬃcial
plan by the Ministry of Interior on 6 June, 2018.121 Furthermore, under new provisions
of the Yarovaya law package, failure to report on a witnessed crime can in itself be
regarded as an act of crime, which further encourages snitching. Beyond this, the law
package has called on the telecommunication operators to increase their storage capa-
cities ‘by 15 percent annually for the next ﬁve years’ and ‘to store correspondence, audio
recordings of conversations, videos’ and other types of user communications from 30
days to six months, depending on their type.122 These regulations, however, are viewed
with scepticism:
The Yarovaya law package will not be fully implemented, it is too costly to store all data in
Russia and they will just not do it. As usual, there is the law, but no one is implementing it.123
There are several groups whose objective is to seek, expose and report on information
and users that are perceived as dangerous. Among these groups is a ‘collective’ that calls
itself Je Suis Maidan. Based on the limited description available on its website and social
media accounts, the group’s objective appears to be centred around identiﬁcation of
‘participants of opposition protests’, and to link their faces to respective social media
proﬁles through ‘various face recognition systems’.124 The website features people across
Russia with links to their social media proﬁles. Visitors are encouraged to send in photos of
‘the heroes’ to be listed on the website. This practice is not a novelty, according to
a Moscow-based rights defender.
The nationalists used to do this around ten years ago. They would make a post with a person’s
full address and invite people to retaliate. There were cases when retaliation took place.125
It is unclear what is done or is expected to be done to protest participants exposed on Je
Suis Maidan. The website can serve as a convenient source of ‘evidence’ for law enforce-
ment, and can potentially encourage harassment of the listed individuals. Equally, it may
GLOBAL CRIME 11
simply lead to no outcomes. The very presence of such a platform, however, can poten-
tially deter protest, with an assumption that having seen own faces online, or faces of
other protesters, people would be discouraged from participating in such events. The
impact and popularity of Je Suis Maidan appear to be marginal, given the mere 137
members on its VKontakte social network page.126
Another group, SILOVIKI [Security oﬃcers], describes itself as a ‘community of security
departments of the Russian Federation’ and enjoys a following of 65,865 subscribers on
Telegram, 6,956 followers on Instagram, 2,990 followers on Twitter, and 660 subscribers
on YouTube.127 It is unclear who stands behind the group. SILOVIKI specialises in the
exposure of activists, protestors, and opposition leaders. In some of the posts, they
provide an image, full name, date of birth, address, phone number, vehicle description
and licence plate numbers, names of parents and other relatives of the targets and openly
call on their followers to ‘say hello’ to the exposed person via the provided phone number
or to ‘decorate’ the target’s car.
The Safe Internet League was established in 2011 with the support of the Ministry of
Digital Development, Communications and Mass Media; the Ministry of Internal Aﬀairs; and
State Duma Committee on Issues of Family, Women and Children.128 The League’s objective
is to ﬁnd and ‘eradicate dangerous content through community action by IT professionals,
industry players, and regular internet users’.129 Under the umbrella of the Safe Internet
League there operates the Kiberdruzhina [Cyber Guards] which is a ‘cross regional public
youth movement’ in its own words, consisting of ‘over 20 thousand volunteers from across
Russia and the CIS’.130 The League’s website explains that Kiberdruzhina is inspired by the
‘Soviet-era druzhinnik neighbourhood watch units’ who ‘helped the authorities maintain law
and order’.131 Such a reference to the past once again underlines the re-packaged nature of
control measures in contemporary Russia. Unlike the Soviet times, fear of punishment for the
failure of reporting and ideological convictions alone are not doing all the justice anymore.
Financial stimulation is used as a tool. ‘In Tyva, they have announced this competition . . . to
compete in reporting on suspicious online activity. The victor would receive 3,000 rubles’.132
Such rewards can lead to false accusations and sabotage of deviant members of commu-
nities. Money is a unique variable, capable of overshadowing political, ideological, and moral
motivations to snitch. ‘There will deﬁnitely be willing people, especially in the provinces, they
will do this outside of any political interest, just to make money’.133 Diversity of motives for
becoming part of the assemblages further widen its scope of reach. While legally obliged
reporting on witnessed crime, at the background of the vagueness of the deﬁnition of this
very crime, can lead to ubiquitous snitching; ﬁnancial rewards for reported crime, in the
system with a weak rule of law, can turn snitching into a business. This comes hand-in-hand
with police forces who are assigned a quota to be fulﬁlled.
At the same time, rights defenders specialising in working with vigilantes believe that
Cyber Guards are ineﬀective and that ‘the media blows their signiﬁcance out of
proportion’,134 and further add that:
The Cyber Guards are a completely dysfunctional entity. There is no functional activity.
Russia’s security apparatus is equipped with automated internet monitoring programmes
and uses them where necessary.
The only purpose of these Cyber Guards entities is to educate the youth, to get them involved
and to lecture them on the danger of certain ideologies. 135
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Constituting sub-assemblages, formations such a Cyber Guards, SILOVIKI and others,
resemble a force of opportunists who can gain certain beneﬁts from serving up to the
state. At the same time, by recruiting such forces, the state fulﬁls several objectives at
once – the watchful gaze seems to be omnipresent; citizenry appears to be politically
active on social media; and while searching for dangerous content online, technologically
savvy and state-loyal vigilantes educate themselves on what is right and what is wrong.
8. Citizen counter-forces
At times, methods utilised in the assemblage work against the regime, as is evident from
the case with the Cossacks136 whose involvement in the dismissal of a public protest on
5 May 2018 created a wide resonance. In this case, face-recognition systems were used by
the regime opponents to identify individuals who beat the protesters. A prominent exam-
ple of a counter-force to the controlling assemblage is the civil analytics project Database,
which publishes ‘free-to-use investigations based on open data’.137 The website maintains
a list of provocateurs, propagandists, law enforcement oﬃcers, judges, snitches, and civil
servants among other actors. It is not clear how this data can be used against pro-regime
actors. The project itself describes the applicability of their investigations as follows:
A signiﬁcant part of our work is done in closed mode and stored in encrypted form according
to all national and international personal data legislation. Access to these data is granted
individually on request from oﬃcial authorities as part of the investigation.138
State support and incentives created for speciﬁc forms of vigilantism lead to inequalities
in operation modes. As researcher in Saint Petersburg explained:
The diﬀerence between “allowed” activists and “not-preferred” activists is that the former
enjoy access to state resources such as the FSB (Federal Security Service). Quite often they
[vigilant audiences] post some data which is impossible to acquire without the assistance of
special services, such as police and MVD [Ministry of Internal Aﬀairs].139
Other citizen-led initiatives include the already mentioned Roskomsvoboda and Internet
Protection Society (IPS). Both organisations counter online censorship and excessive
internet control. While IPS is closely linked with Putin’s main opposition leader Alexei
Navalny, Roskomsvoboda has been invited to the advisory group of State Duma
Committee on Information Policy, Information Technology and Communications.140 In
countering repressive measures of the state, the largest problem for counter forces is lack
of unity. As St. Petersburg-based lawyer explained:
I don’t believe that users can be uniﬁed in one way or another. In Armenia, we recently saw
how the people collectively stood up in opposition to the state. This will not be the case in
Russia because opposition or social movements will not be able to unite. They oppose the
state from very diﬀerent standpoints.141
Thus, not only citizen counter-forces are scarce and inferior to the state in their capacities;
they are also not necessarily uniﬁed. While technological aﬀordances allow citizens to
monitor and expose the ‘previously exempt’ actors; immunities, asymmetries, and other
capacities must be considered in this uneven landscape. In Russia, with the greatly
deﬁned and enforced vertical of power, the ruling elite is in advantage in spite of any
‘leveling of the hierarchy of surveillance’.142
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9. Discussion
In the current understanding of surveillant mechanisms applied to the digital domain, the
virtual other, or the ‘data-double’,143 is constantly monitored and can attract institutional
gaze towards the conventional self. In some cases, this dynamic is reversed as conven-
tional ‘oﬀences’ get tied to the concerned individual’s digital trace, leading to arrests and
ﬁnes. In other words, a person facing charges for online speech can already be in the focus
of security forces for their oﬄine activities. Amid the conveniently vague legislation
governing online speech in Russia, for the law enforcement authorities, it is a matter of
linking one element with the other – i.e. oﬄine activism with the digital trace. Contrary to
the ‘data-double’ theorisation, the physical person is selected ﬁrst. As a Moscow-based
rights defender explained:
It is quite obvious that a person is selected ﬁrst, and then they select online content that
could be attached to the case. It is just so easy to ﬁnd something [in the content shared
online] that violates the law.144
Therefore, the original author of a given social media post may not suﬀer any conse-
quences, while those who shared or otherwise engaged with this content might face the
law, depending on the nature of their oﬄine activities. The vagueness of deﬁnitions and
police forces equipped with quotas establish dangerous realities where any user can face
charges over any online activity.
Hand in hand with the legislative measures, the Kremlin employs and endorses145
activists who engage in vigilantism and snitching. The lines between authority and
citizens blur in this regard as vigilant citizens become an extension of the state. Thus,
amid the increasing control over the digital domain, the state is allowing regime-loyal
citizens to be active online, creating an illusion of citizen-led participation in domestic
aﬀairs, while reinforcing the fear of ubiquitous surveillance and the all-seeing gaze of the
state. This dynamic opens a window of opportunity for actors willing to serve-up to the
state, while the actual eﬀectiveness of such formations is questionable.
With legislative frameworks that are open to interpretation and regulations that
criminalise failure to report on a crime (accompanied with measures that encourage
snitching by oﬀering ﬁnancial and other rewards), it could be expected that user arrests
would be counted in tens of thousands, if not in millions. Is Russia’s ‘surveillant assem-
blage’ weak, or is it selective by virtue? What is the role of state-recruited vigilant citizens
in denouncing users? As a Moscow-based human rights defender explained, ‘what is
taking place [in Russia] today with all these “concerned” citizens is a joke. It is on such
a primitive level, you wouldn’t believe it’. Their colleague adds, ‘our law enforcement
system is too weak to carry out arrests on a mass scale, they only do targeted arrests’.146
Presumably, the logic behind this measure is the instigation of self-censorship. Having
seen others arrested for a social media post, users are expected to think twice before
sharing, or even “liking” similar content. As such, the repressive system is rather unpre-
dictable; yet, uncertainty and unpredictability of the assemblage can create fruitful
grounds for self-censorship, making the system eﬀective by virtue of its dysfunctionality.
The regime revealed itself as both devious and inconsequential. It is devious in the
sense that it does not skimp on entrapment of citizens, or on targeting teenagers and
single mothers. At the same time, the regime is inconsequential in its selective response
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to online oﬀences. As is evident from the cases, content that is deemed dangerous when
“liked” or shared by some users is not removed and continues to circulate online; rather,
the regime removes select citizens who engage with this content.
Citizen counter-forces indeed represent a scenario where, as per Haggerty and Ericson,
those previously exempt from surveillance also fall under the gaze. Citizens monitor and
reveal cases of rights violations, and instrumentalise similar ‘weapons’ of exposure that
are used against them. However, the state (represented by the ruling elite) is in an obvious
advantage with its law enforcement apparatus, legislative framework and technological
capabilities.
10. Conclusion
Despite the autocratic turn in its policies following the initial liberalisation in the 1990s,
and in contrast to the perceived omnipotence of its security apparatus, when put under
the magnifying glass, Russia’s surveillant assemblage indicates that multiplicity of its
components and dysfunctionalities therein require the state to rely on a set of superﬁcial
measures designed to stimulate self-censorship. Among such measures are random and
selective arrests of social media users, as well as recruitment of vigilant citizens, intended
to assist the ruling elite in battling undesired online content.
Having unpacked Russia’s surveillant assemblage, this article provided an overview of
the types of online engagements which can cost social media users their freedom; it
elaborated on the means of retaliation, by focusing on legal frameworks applied to social
media oﬀences; and it unpacked the elements (sub-assemblages) that collectively, but not
exhaustively, make up contemporary surveillance practices in Russia. The analysis
revealed several intriguing nuances in the Kremlin’s approaches to internet control. First
of all, the adapted legislative framework creates an environment in which, if needed,
virtually any online activity can be tied to repressive legislation. The applicability of the
law, in this case, is selective. This selectivity exempliﬁes a reverse approach to the ‘data-
double’, as conventional behaviour of an individual can lead to scrutinisation of their
digital trace.
While the Kremlin has taken respective measures to mute, eradicate, discourage, and
otherwise limit voices that challenge its authority, Russia’s surveillant assemblage has
a central goal but no central motivations that could unite all of its sub-assemblages.
Motivation is a subjective concept inside each sub-assemblage – be it law enforcement,
regional authorities, or vigilant citizens. Motives may also vary among citizen counter-
forces opposing repressive state measures; however, issues of unity and collaboration also
come into play in this domain.
Social media user convictions in Russia are a by-product of the system where the desire
to control deﬁes a systematic approach. While this deﬁance may be interpreted as
a weakness of the central structure, ambiguity and monomania of the structure make
everyone potentially vulnerable. Due to technical and ﬁnancial inability to replicate
a Chinese-style ﬁrewall, Russia’s ruling elite opted for ‘trolling’ the web through the
spread of fear via repressive legislation, selective arrests, and regime-loyal citizens acting
out in the manner that echoes the country’s totalitarian past. As Daucé, Loveluck,
Ostromooukhova, and Zaytseva put it, Russia can be viewed as ‘a test laboratory for plural
forms of citizen participation in online security’.147
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In the global perspective, current measures adopted by the Kremlin serve as examples
of ‘best practices’ to other autocratic regimes, seeking to establish control over online self-
expression. As international, regional and domestic governance of the world wide web is
entering discourse at the level of the United Nations,148 an informed and sober outlook on
the role and inﬂuence of political, legislative, social, and economic realities on internet
governance is pressing.
Further research should focus on the role of international and domestic social media
platforms, messengers, and content sharing outlets in Russia and beyond; enriching
literature and policy through comparative analyses across governance approaches.
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Interviewee Comments Date
Academic I St. Petersburg-based. Specialising in Russia’s online activism. Online interview. 2018
Academic II St. Petersburg-based. Specialising in Russia’s online activism. Online interview. 2018
Academic III Finland-based. Specialising in Russia’s digital media and online culture. Online
interview.
2018
Lawyer I Lawyer specialising in Russian cases in the European Court for Human Rights. In-person
interview, St. Petersburg.
2018
Lawyer II Specialising in internet-related arrests. In-person interview, Moscow. 2018
Law Enforcement I Lieutenant colonel. State penitentiary service. Online interview. 2018
NGO I Specialising in public opinion monitoring. In-person interview, Moscow. 2018
Rights Defender I Specialising in vigilantism . In-person interview, Moscow. 2018
Online interview. 2019
Rights Defender II Specialising in vigilantism. In person interview, Moscow. 2018
Rights Defender III Specialising in xenophobia. In-person interview, Moscow. 2018
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